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punishment under the Eighth
Amendment and subjected him to
slavery in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The court disposed of
these claims as "patently meritless"
for two reasons. First, the court
found that Sibley received adequate
protection in this case. Second, the

Thirteenth Amendment generally
protects against labor compelled by
the "use or threatened use of
physical or legal coercion." The
court also dismissed Sibley's
Thirteenth Amendment claim after
finding that the salary offset did not
coerce Sibley to work for the

government.
In sum, the court held that no
compelling basis existed for setting
aside the Department's decision to
offset Sibley's salary. Therefore, the
court entered summary judgment
was entered for the defendant.

Cosigners protected against primary liability
by Jennifer L. Schilling
In Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 660 N.E.2d 94
(I11.
App. Ct. 1995), cosigners to loans sought damages
from Nationwide Cassel, a credit finance company, for
violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and the
Illinois Sales Finance Agency Act. The trial court
dismissed the complaint because the cosigners failed to
set out facts necessary to state a claim under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. The appellate
court reviewed each of the trial court's findings and
subsequently held that the trial court erred in dismissing
the cosigners' claim.
The plaintiffs, Rodney Lee and Edelmira Rivera,
("the cosigners") in separate and unrelated circumstances acted as "cosigners" to loans financed through
the defendant, Nationwide Cassel ("Cassel"). Both Lee
and Rivera, signed as cosigners to a loan for a motor
vehicle financed through Cassel in order to help a friend
obtain credit approval. The cosigners brought action
against Cassel for damages because Cassel requested
that the cosigners sign as "buyers" and subsequently
attempted to make them primarily responsible for the
loan. The cosigners claimed that Cassel violated § 18 of
the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act ("Motor
Vehicle Act"), which serves to protect cosigners from
being held primarily responsible for defaulted loans.
Under the statute, cosigners are only held primarily
responsible if they "actually receive the vehicle" or if
they are the spouse or parent of the cosigned individual.
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375/18 (West 1992). The
cosigners asserted that Cassel's violation of § 18
amounted to "unfair and deceptive" practice under the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act
("CFDPA").
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The trial court identified three reasons for dismissal:
(1) dismissal was the only course of action consistent
with the holding of Magna Bank of McLean County v.
Comer, 600 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); (2) the
cosigners' signatures on the loan documents indicating
that they were "buyers" established that they had
"actually received" the vehicles; and (3) the cosigners'
complaint failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity to state a claim under the CFDPA. The appellate
court reviewed each finding and ultimately reversed the
trial court's dismissal of the claims.

Fraud and misrepresentation are not
requisite elements
The trial court rejected the cosigners' claims for relief
based on the holding in Magna Bank of McLean County
v. Comer, 600 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), which
provides that § 18 of the Motor Vehicle Act is an
applicable defense from primary liability only when the
seller engages in fraud or misrepresentation. The
appellate court rejected the analysis in Comer and held
that § 18 clearly requires "actual receipt" to establish
primary liability. Liability does not depend on whether
fraud or deceptive practices are involved. 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 375/18 (West 1992). The appellate court
held that, under § 18, a signatory who (1) takes "actual
receipt"; or (2) is the parent or spouse of the individual
who takes possession of the vehicle may be primarily
liable. Any other individual who signs the sales agreement is only secondarily liable. An obligation only arises
for parties who are secondarily liable after the seller,
using reasonable and diligent efforts, has exhausted all
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ordinary legal means to collect from the primary obligor.

A signature cannot confer primary
liability
The trial court also found that the cosigners were not
entitled to relief because their signatures on the loan
contract designating them as "buyers" sufficiently
established that the individual "actually received" the
vehicle. Again, the appellate court rejected the trial
court's finding. The appellate court held that § 18 of the
Motor Vehicle Act limits primary liability to consumers
who take actual possession of the vehicle, regardless of
how the parties are designated in the contract. Contractual designations of "buyer" or "co-buyer" do not
establish primary liability because § 18 serves to protect
cosigners from assuming primary liability for the full
debt of a loan when the cosigners have never possessed
the vehicle and have merely signed the contract as a
guarantor of the debt.

Cause of action is sufficiently pled
Finally, the trial court ruled that the cosigners failed
to sufficiently state a claim under the CFDPA. The
cosigners' complaint alleged that Cassel, along with
automobile dealerships, instituted a plan of having
persons sign as "buyers" when, in fact, the cosigners
only intend to serve as guarantors with secondary
liability. The cosigners alleged that Cassel required them
to sign as buyers and then attempted to hold them
primarily liable for the loan even though Cassel knew
that the cosigners were neither the actual possessors nor
the parent or spouse of the individual for whom they
cosigned. The appellate court found the claim sufficient
to state a cause of action under the CFDPA and held that
the trial court erred in dismissing the claim. The court
concluded that the cosigners stated a sufficient claim
because (1) fraud or misrepresentation by the seller is
not required for § 18 of the Motor Vehicle Act to afford
protection to signatories of a contract; (2) the decision in
Comer erroneously held that a signature designating an
individual as a buyer was sufficient to show actual
receipt; and (3) the cosigners sufficiently alleged fraud
with sufficient particularity to state a claim under the
CFDPA.
The appellate court held that the cosigners sufficiently stated a claim for fraud because their complaint
1996

alleged that Cassel and the automobile dealership
required the cosigners sign as buyers with the knowledge that such practice violated the protections established in § 18 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The cosigners
alleged that Cassel sought to collect payment from
individuals who were clearly protected from primary
obligation. Further, Cassel attempted to collect the debt
from both cosigners without exhausting efforts to collect
from the actual possessor of the vehicle. The appellate
court held that the alleged facts sufficiently created a
claim upon which the cosigners may be entitled to relief.
Thus, the cosigners are entitled to a trial on the issues.
Therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded
the trial court's decision. The appellate court did not
address whether § 18 of the Motor Vehicle Act can serve
as the basis for a private right of action under the
CFDPA or the Finance Agency Act or whether the
pleadings set out sufficient facts for a claim under the
Finance Agency Act. The appellate court held that § 18
affords protection to cosigners regardless of an absence
of fraud on the part of the sellers and regardless of the
sales contract's designation of the cosigners as "buyers."
The court further held that the cosigners' claims set out
sufficient facts to state a cause of action. Therefore, the
trial court improperly dismissed the case.

Dissent from Justice Egan
Justice Egan dissented, unconvinced that the complaint alleged facts sufficient to establish a cause of
action for fraud. Justice Egan reasoned that Cassel may
have interpreted the statutory protection of § 18 in
accordance with the decision in Comer, 600 N.E.2d at
855. The Comer court held that primary liability of a
cosigner could only be avoided if the seller engaged in
fraud. According to the dissent, Cassel's attempt to
secure payment from the cosigners was clearly an action
in accordance with the interpretation supported by the
appellate court decision. Justice Egan reasoned that the
cosigners willingly signed the contract which designated
them as "buyers." Under Comer, Cassel was rightfully
justified in attempting to collect payment. Thus, the
cosigners satisfied neither a claim for fraud nor damages.
Editor's Note: On April 3, 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed an appeal on the issue. Lee v.
Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 664 N.E.2d 642 (Ill. 1996).
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